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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
It seems quite unjust that one of the two litigants in an action should be re-
quired to sit back and wait for the other litigant and the trial court judge to
"fight it out" in the appellate court over the issuance of the writ of mandamus to
expunge the judge's order on a particular motion, but such will be the case
unless the Supreme Court's ruling is to reverse the Court of Appeals in the
second Rock Island case.
As was said in the dissenting opinion in the second Rock Island case:
Our mandamus power is not a muscle which requires exercise to maintain its
vitality. More slides into abdication, today, than a mere order of transfer finally wrested
from our court."
.. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F. 2d 299 (C.A. 7th, 1955) (quotation from slip
opinion case No. 11247 at 13).
EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
As the law of labor relations has grown since the original National Labor
Relations Act' (Wagner Act) and the volumes of decisions have evolved on the
subject, the conflict between the right of employer free speech and the right of
employee self-organization has also grown.2
The right of employer free speech has been specifically recognized in Section
8 (c) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act,4 as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act). However, the efficacy of this right is
offset by Sec. 7 of the LMRA,5 which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. .... 6
The problem most frequently arises prior to a representation election when
an employer speaks to his employees on the premises during working hours and
refuses representatives of the union an equal opportunity to reply under the
same conditions. Assuming that the union loses the election, it then becomes
necessary to determine if the employer has been guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice, which would be grounds for setting aside the election. In the decisions
handed down by the National Labor Relations Board7 and the courts on this
149 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
2 See for an appraisal, Kovar, Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech: The Livingston Shirt
and Peerless Plywood Cases, 3 De Paul L. Rev. 184 (1954).
8 "The expressing of any views, agreement, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof..
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
4 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
1 Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
6 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1947).
1 Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
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subject, three questions are usually decisive of the issue: the existence or non-
existence of discrimination where the employer has a no-solicitation rule in
effect, whether or not the employees are being given an equal opportunity to
hear both sides of the issue, and whether or not the employer has imposed
serious handicaps to employee self-organization by the nature of his business
and the way in which it is conducted.
Under the Wagner Act the Board strongly upheld the employee's right ot
self-organization by enforcing Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, which read:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec. 7 of the Act. 8
The Board applied the theory that the employer's economic power created a
compulsion among employees to follow the employer's wishes for fear of other-
wise becoming jobless,' which in effect overrode the employer's right to free
speech regardless of the lack of coercion. The Board also adopted the "totality-
of-conduct" doctrine, where even normally protected statements of an em-
ployer were branded as unfair labor practices if made in a background of anti-
union activity by the employer."
In Matter of Clark Bros." the Board gave rise to the "captive audience" doc-
trine by deciding that the mere act of compelling employees to listen to an anti-
union speech during working hours on the premises, regardless of what the
employer said, was an unfair labor practice. However, the Court of Appeals
would not go that far in enforcing the Board's ruling. The court upheld the
Board's ruling on the basis of evidence showing an aggressive anti-union cam-
paign, of which the employer's speech was the culmination. The court also
found the employer's acts to be coercive and an interference with the em-
ployee's right to self-organization. But by way of dictum the court stated:
An employer has an interest in presenting his views on labor relations to his employ-
ees. We should hesitate to hold that he may not do this on company time and pay,
provided a similar opportunity to address them were accorded representatives of the
union. 3
Although the court in the Clark Bros. case laid down a more or less restrictive
rule as compared to the Board, the dictum of the court was to have considerable
import in the future."4
849 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1) (1935).
1 NLRB v. Federbush, 121 F. 2d 954 (C.A. 2d, 1941). Contra: NLRB v. Citizen-News
Co., 134 F. 2d 962 (C.A. 9th, 1943).
10 NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
1170 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
12 NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 163 F. 2d 373 (C.A. 2d, 1947).
13 Ibid., at 376.
14 In the Clark Bros. case the'union did not request equal speaking time from the employer,
so the court was not called upon to rule on this issue.
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Section 8 (c), the free speech provision of the Act, was embodied in tile Taft-
Hartley amendment for the purpose of guaranteeing to employers as well as to
unions the right of free speech. This section is considered a restatement of the
principle embodied in the First Amendment of the United StatesConstitution,"I
and was enacted to remedy the situation which arose under the Wagner Act
viz., that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to address his em-
ployees in opposition to a union, even though his address was entirely uncoer-
cive. The legislature specifically condemned the decision of the Board in the
Clark Bros. case as being too restrictive of the right of employer free speech.'"
As a result, the Board changed its view in a later case and ruled that if an
employer compelled his employees to attend and listen to an anti-union speech
the language of Section 8 (c) and its legislative history made it clear that the
Clark Bros. doctrine no longer existed."7 Going further, in a later case, the
Board also ruled that the "captive audience" aspect of employer's speeches, as
protected by the free speech provision of the amended act, could not form the
basis for a finding that the employer, by denying the union an equal opportunity
to use its facilities and time, has interfered with the employee's free choice of a
bargaining representative.18 Here the employer made two protected pre-
election speeches to its employees during working hours and ignored the
union's request for a like opportunity. Thus the dictum in the Clark Bros. case
was not invoked. The Board then felt that it was carrying out the intent of the
legislature in passing the Act.
The presence of a no-solicitation rule can affect tile result in this type of
case. Generally, a no-solicitation rule is one set forth by an employer which
prohibits union organizers from using the employer's premises for the purpose
of soliciting the employees to form or join a union. Such a rule is held to be
valid and lawful when it is limited and effective only during working hours.
Working time is said to be for work and not union activity. 9 After working
hours the employee's time is his own, therefore solicitation of such persons is
deemed permissible, even if the employer's premises are used. A no-solicitation
rule effective both during working and nonworking time is considered an
unreasonable impediment to self-organization, and therefore discriminatory,
unless there exist special circumstances arising out of the nature of the business
that make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline." Where an
employer has the latter type of rule and such special circumstances do exist, it
is considered lawful and is termed a broad, but privileged, no-solicitation rule.
Until Matter of Bonwit Teller, Inc." the Board had never ruled upon employer
11 NLRB v. Bailey Co., 180 F. 2d 278 (C.A. 6th, 1950).
"Senate Report No. 105 on Sen. 1126 at 24-25.
17 Matter of Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
18 Matter of S. & S. Corrugated Paper Machinery Co. Inc., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
19 Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943). 20 Ibid.
2196 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
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free speech where an employer had a no-solicitation rule in effect. Rulings had
been handed down, however, that lawful no-solicitation rules, applied in a dis-
criminatory manner, violated the act when enforced against union solicitation,
even though other forms of solicitation were permitted;22 or when enforced
against solicitation by one union although another union was permitted to
solicit. 3
Bonwit Teller, Inc., v. NLRB 4 is the leading case on this topic and has been
cited in practically every decision dealing with the subject matter of this com- -
ment. The employer operated a retail department store and had in effect a
broad, but privileged, no-solicitation rule due to the nature of its business;25
union solicitation on the selling floors of the store would tend to disrupt the em-
ployer's business.2 1 Six days prior to a representation election, the employer's
president made a speech to his employees on the company time and premises but
refused the union's request for an equal opportunity to reply. The subject of
pending wage increases was discussed in the speech,and there were department
meetings with the employer's president on the subject of unionization as well as
some statements of the employer's supervisory employees, alleged to have been
designed to influence the election. On a petition by the union to set aside the
election, the Board held that the employer enforced its no-solicitation rule in a
discriminatory manner when he denied the union request for the same amount
of speaking time. This denied the employees a reasonable opportunity to hear
both sides of the issue of union representation. The Board also cited the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the Clark Bros. case emphasizing that the dicta in
the case was not dicta at all, but the law on the subject. The Board then pro-
vided an interpretation of the rule which it set down by stating:
That is not to say that an employer is proscribed from addressing his employees and
urging that they reject a union unless he invites a union representative to come into his
plant and make an appeal for support of the union. Nor does it mean that under any and
all circumstances an employer is under an obligation to accede to a union's request that
it be granted an opportunity to address the employees on the employer's premises. It is
to say that an employer who chooses to use his premises to assemble his employees and
speak against a union man may not deny that union's reasonable request for the same
opportunity to present its case, where the circumstances are such that only by granting
such request will the employees have a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides.2"
22 NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 7th, 1946).
23 NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
24 197 F. 2d 640 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
25 NLRB v. May Department Stores Co., 154 F. 2d 533 (C.A. 8th, 1946).
26 As to the areas of the store in which the employer may prohibit union solicitation, em-
ployee restaurants and cafeterias which are closed to the public and public waiting and wash
rooms are upheld; whereas solicitation in a street or alleyway which ran between portions of
the store and which was owned by the store was held to be invalid. Marshall Field & Co. v.
NLRB, 200 F. 2d 375 (C.A. 7th, 1952).
27 Matter of Bonwit-Teller, hic., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951).
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On appeal the court found that the speeches by the employer's president
were protected by the free speech provision of the Act and the supervisory
employees' utterances were of the same quality.2" But the court affirmed the
Board concerning the discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule in
that the employer refused to grant the union request. The court further stated
by dictum:
If Bonwit Teller were to abandon that rule, we do not think it would then be re-
quired to accord the Union a similar opportunity to address the employees each time
Rudolph (employer's president) made an anti-union speech. Nothing in the Act nor in
reason compels such "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" result so long as the
avenues of communication are kept open to both sides.2"
Chief Judge Swan, in dissenting, expressed the opinion that "Section 8 (c)
of the Act .. .grants the employer the privilege of arguing against unioniza-
tion without any limitation except that the expression of his views must contain
'no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.' "30 A no-solicitation rule
cannot cut down the rights granted by Section 8 (c) of the Act. Judge Swan also
made note of the fact that the majority based its decision on authorities decided
prior to enactment of Section 8 (c).
Both the Board and the Court of Appeals decided that employer free speech
was not involved.
The Bonwit Teller case led to broad applications of its rule. In Matter of Bill-
more Manufacturing Company"' an employer of a manufacturing concern made
an anti-union speech to its assembled employees two hours before the election
opened. An employee union representative was denied similar opportunity to
reply thereto where the employer had no rule barring union solicitation on com-
pany time and property. However, the Board expressly followed the Bonwit
case and decided that the employer interfered with the employees' freedom of
choice in the selection of a bargaining representative; setting aside the elec-
tion. 2 It is interesting to note at this point that this was an adoption of the
dictum of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in affirming the Board's
decision in the Clark Bros. case.
In the cases of Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc. and Massachusetts Motor Car Com-
pany, Inc. 3 the employer used company time and premises to make a pre-
election speech two days prior to a representation election, and refused a re-
quest of the union for an equal forum. Metropolitan had a limited no-solicitation
rule and was held to have discriminatorily applied it. The Massachusetts Com-
pany did not have a no-solicitation rule and yet was held guilty of an unfair
28 Bonwit-Teller, Inc., v. NLRB, 197 F. 2d 640 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
29 Ibid., at 646. 81 Ibid.
3197 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
32 Board Member Reynolds dissenting.
"3Decided together in 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953).
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labor practice for refusing the union request on the theory that the right of
employees freely to select or reject union representation has been curtailed.
Chairman Herzog of the Board dissented insofar as the Massachusetts case
was concerned on the theory that in the absence of a discriminatory application
of a no-solicitation rule, Section 8 (c) of the Act should apply.
It was held in NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., Inc.14 that a broad no-
solicitation rule by a manufacturing plant, refusing to allow any solicitation on
the premises during working and nonworking hours, was itself an unfair labor
practice, and it was an added unfair labor practice for an employer to address
the employees and deny the union's request for the same privilege while such
a rule was in force. The court recognized a duty of the employer to allow solici-
tation on the premises during nonworking hours, which duty the Supreme
Court in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB11 recognized as within the power of
the Board to impose in all industrial plants. American Tube Bending expressly
followed Bonwit Teller.
Under the so-called Bonwit Teller rule manufacturers as well as retailers who
used company time and property for making anti-union speeches before repre-
sentation elections were required, upon request, to grant the union equal oppor-
tunity to reply under similar circumstances. Failure to grant such a request was
held to be both an unfair labor practice and a ground for setting aside the subse-
quent election, where the union had been defeated. It seems as if the Board
disregarded the element of a no-solicitation rule being present in handing down
these decisions.
A case then came before the Board8" where an employer, through its man-
ager, delivered protected anti-union speeches on company time and premises
prior to a representation election. This employer owned a retail variety store
chain, and had in effect a broad but privileged no-solicitation rule which it
enforced by refusing to grant the request of the union for an opportunity to
reply to the employer's speeches on its premises during working hours. The
employer was F. W Woolworth Co. The union had begun its campaign five
months prior to the election, contacting Woolworth's employees in their homes
and other public meeting places during this period. The union hall was ap-
proximately one and one half blocks from Woolworth's store and the em-
ployees were easily available for contact by the union. In the proceeding before
the NLRB, the Board ruled that Woolworth discriminatorily applied its no-
solicitation rule by refusing the union request, and was thereby guilty of an
unfair labor practice. The election, which the union lost, was set aside and the
Board rendered its usual cease and desist order. This decision went to the Court
of Appeals for review.
In the meantime, however, in the Livingston Shirt Corp. 7 case the new Board
84 205 F. 2d 45 (C.A. 2d, 1953). 36 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
3 Matter ofF. W Woolworth Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953).
31 107JN.L.R.B. 109 (1954).
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ruled that an employer does not violate the Act by making a speech to his em-
ployees on company time and property three days before an election, when he
denies the union's request for an opportunity to reply. Here the employer had a
limited no-solicitation rule, prohibiting union solicitation only during working
hours. The union therefore had access to the employer's premises during non-
working hours. Livingston was a manufacturing concern, but the employer's
status as a retailer or manufacturer is important only in determining the validity
of its no-solicitation rule.
The Board recognized Section 8 (c) of the Act and went as far as saying that
even the Bonwit Teller case did not require an employer who exercised his own
rights under the statute (free speech provision) to incur an affirmative obliga-
tion to donate his premises and working time to the union. The Board further
rejected the idea of making the facilities of the employer available to the union,
while at the same time recognizing that the employee has the right to hear both
sides under circumstances which approximate equality.38 All decisions of the
Board inconsistent with the Livingston case were specifically overruled by this
decision." 9
On appeal in the Woolworth case the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
denied enforcement of the Board's order and held that a no-solicitation rule
cannot prevent an employer from conferring with his employees on his own
time and property. The court also stated that the rule is not discriminatorily
applied because of the employer's refusal to permit the union to campaign on its
premises when there are adequate facilities for access to the employees. 40
The court distinguished a group of cases which upheld the board's ruling in
the Woolworth case. On the basis of the facts, the adequacy of facilities, based
upon the nature of the business and the way it is conducted, is controlling. The
courts have recognized the Board's ruling under exceptional circumstances.
Where the premises are a ship,4 a lumber camp,42 or a company dominated
town, 43 union organizers must be given reasonable access to the employees who
live on the premises and who are not readily open to contact by representatives
of the union. The Supreme Court has therefore held that adequacy of facilities
is material. 44
The court in the Woolworth case first decided that the broad no-solicitation
38 The Board has established a new election rule that makes it a ground for setting aside an
election, but not on unfair labor practice, where an employer or a union makes speeches to
employees on working time within 24 hours of a Board conducted election. Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1953).
11 Massachusetts Motor Car Co., Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953); Biltmore Manufactur-
ing Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
40 NLRB v. F. W Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78 (C.A. 6th, 1954).
41 NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
42 NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (C.A. 6th, 1948).
13 NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949). 41 Ibid.
COMMENTS
rule was privileged due to the nature of the employer's business. The court then
held that the employer's speeches were permissible due to Section 8 (c) of the
Act which makes them lawful speeches. The court concluded that two lawful
acts cannot be turned into an unfair labor practice.
The court also held that there are no limitations upon employer free speech
other than contained in Section 8 (c) of the Act. The free speech provision does
not provide that an employer who expresses his views on unionization to his
employees on the premises during working time must give an equal opportunity
to the union. Also in its opinion the court stated:
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Swan in the Bonwit Teller case is the correct
holding, that Section 8 (c) has direct and controlling application and that a no-solicita-
tion rule cannot cut down the rights given the employer under Section 8 (c) .4
The concurring opinion delivered by Judge Miller expressed the view that
the employer's refusal of the union's request was discriminatory, but not unlaw-
fully so, since each has the right to the lawful use of the customary fora and
media available to each of them and there is no duty to make the facilities of one
available to the other. Judge Miller also said that the act complained of dealt
only with working time so that the portion of the rule pertaining to nonwork-
ing time was not involved and was not enforced, citing the Livingston case for
his authority.
Judge McAllister in dissenting based his opinion mainly upon Bonywit Teller.
In a more recent case before the Board, that of Johnson La'wn Mower Corp.,4 6 a
manufacturing concern had a broad no-solicitation rule and refused a union
request to speak to the employees on company time and property after the
employer had done so. The Board held it to be an unfair labor practice to have
such a rule and an additional unfair labor practice for applying the rule in a
discriminatory manner. This case follows the American Tube case and is the
correct result.
The only difference between the Johnston or American Tube cases and the
Livingston case is the type of no-solicitation rule; therefore the existence or
nonexistence of a no-solicitation rule is controlling.
The Board and courts are beginning to recognize and apply the free speech
provision of the Act. Previous to the Livingston case, they held it was not in-
volved in finding an unfair labor practice, where an employer made an anti-
union speech to his employees on company time and property and refused to
grant a union request for a similar opportunity. However, in the absence of an
invalid no-solicitation rule, or the unlawful discriminatory application of a
valid rule, the employer free speech provision will be applied today.
As to what constitutes an invalid rule there is little or no dispute, but as to
when the employer's denial of a union request will amount to the unlawful dis-
criminatory application of a no-solicitation rule seems to remain highly con-
45NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78, 81 (1954).
46 110 N.L.R.B. 220 (1954).
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troversial. Under almost identical sets of facts Bonwit Teller and Woolworth
were decided differently.
Where there is a limited rule, employees are accessible during nonworking
hours on the company property. This accessibility is considered equal oppor-
tunity to hear both sides. Therefore, only a speech promising benefit or threat-
ening reprisal will constitute an unfair labor practice.
Where there is a broad rule, the existence of the rule itself is an unfair labor
practice unless the rule is privileged. When the privilege exists, then, on the
basis of the Woolworth decision, it may be said that the employer is not required
to grant the union equal time provided there are no exceptional circumstances
which would interfere with the employee's right of self-organization, such as a
company owned town or the like.
Both Bonwit Teller and Woolworth were department stores with broad, privi-
leged rules and both made protected anti-union speeches to their employees on
company time and property before refusing a union's request for equal oppor-
tunity to reply prior to a representation election. Both were located in vast
metropolitan areas where a number of halls are available within easy reach of
prospective union members. The court in the Woolworth case tried to distinguish
the Bonwit case on the basis of the facts; that "promises of benefit had been
made by the employer in the announcement of pending wage increases and
threats of reprisal had been made by a supervisory employee to influence an
election," while in Woolworth the one act was the refusal, after the manager's
address, to permit the union to use the premises for its campaign. This distinc-
tion is contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in the Bonwit case which found the Bonwit speeches protected by the free
speech provision of the Act.
The change in policy of the Board in Woolworth, with its approval by the
Sixth Circuit, reduces the persuasive value of the Second Circuit Bonwit case
considerably. Perhaps the Supreme Court will eventually put the matter to rest.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES
The calling of young men to serve in the armed forces of the United States
has been limited by Congress in that those who are conscientiously opposed to
such service have been exempted. An entire body of law has arisen concerning
members of Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious semi-pacifist sect, over the clas-
sification of that organization's members in regard to this exemption. In much
the same manner as the Supreme Court had handed down on one day four deci-
sions that reviewed the propriety of the "net worth" method of proving tax
fraud,1 so too, the Court on March 14, 1955 rendered four opinions that de-
fined the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses for draft purposes.2
1 See page 237 of this issue.
Gonzales v. U.S., 348 U.S. 407 (1955); Simmons v. U.S., 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Sicu'rella
v. U.S., 348 U.S. 385 (1955);Witmer v. U.S., 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
